Citation of law
This section just gives the law its official name. The set of rules in this chapter is called 'The Workers' Compensation Law.'
287.010. of law. — This chapter shall be known as "The Law".
(RSMo 1939 § 3689, A.L. 1980 H.B. 1396)
Prior revision: 1929 § 3299
(1960) Defenses that injuries to employee were subject to and that was estopped to sue by accepting s cannot be raised by to dismiss but should be asserted by . Roberts v. Epicure Foods Co. (Mo.), 330 S.W.2d 837.
(1960) Fact that employee who is required to work in place where she necessarily inhaled noxious fumes with the result that she pulmonary emphysema did not render the workmen's compensation law of Missouri inapplicable to her injury. for negligence of employer dismissed. Oggesen v. General Cable Corp., 273 F.2d 331.
(1962) Where man in attempting to unlock a perforating machine placed a pipe over wrench handle and bounced up and down on end of pipe thereby ing back injury, the injury was an accident and . Brotherton v. International Shoe Company (A.), 360 S.W.2d 108.
(1962) Evidence supported finding as result of fall suffered fifteen percent of left arm where elbow was enlarged and would tire during the day although there was no loss of motion and claimant suffered no loss of earnings. Franklin v. St. Louis Packing Company (A.), 360 S.W.2d 350.
(1963) Evidence was sufficient to justify finding of that claimant an accident when he slipped on floor and twisted his back while holding a sixty- sack of sugar and fell resulting in injuries to his lower back his medical was only to the effect that it was possible that the accident resulted in the back injury. Smith v. Company (A.), 372 S.W.2d 659.
(1967) Where employee was injured in automobile accident while on the way to work in transportation furnished by the employer, the transportation was an implied term of and within the scope of the contract, and the accident arose out of and in the course of employee's employment. Griffin v. Ross (A.), 411 S.W.2d 649.
(1967) An accidental injury "arises out of" employment only when there is a causal connection between the employee's injury and his employment, and a claimant meets this requirement only when the injury is the rational consequence of an act to his employment. Blatt v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (A.), 413 S.W.2d 533.
(1967) A showing that claimant's job involved pulling two hundred and fifty pound car loaded with staves onto a skid and was done intentionally in accordance with preconceived design and that nothing unusual occurred other than claimant feeling a pain was not sufficient evidence to sustain the that claimant had experienced an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Bauer v. Independent Stave Co. (A.), 417 S.W.2d 693.
(1968) Driver hired by to work ly on hauling for cooperage company, under the direction and control of cooperage company, was employee of cooperage company for workmen's purposes. Feldmann v. Dot Delivery Service (A.), 425 S.W.2d 491.
(1980) of parents of deceased worker for compensation for alleged of worker in employment accident under Workers' Compensation Law; overruling Miller v. Hotel Savoy Co. (A.), 68 S.W.2d 929. Combs v. City of Maryville (A.), 609 S.W.2d 475.
(1991) Where worker alleges and intentional infliction of , Missouri's workers' compensation law provides exclusive remedy for emotional distress inflicted during course of employment. Waldermeyer v. ITT Financial Corp., 767 F.Supp. 989 (E.D. Mo.).
(1993) Where employee alleged former employer invaded her privacy because there was peep hole between her bathroom and supervisors' bathroom, court ruled that in all instances where an injured person seeks to hold employer under any common law tort theory, including intentional torts, for injuries resulting from work experiences, has exclusive initial to determine whether injuries are result of an accident covered by workers' compensation. Massey v. Victor I. Phillips Co., 827 F.Supp. 597 (W.D. Mo.).
(1993) Where police officer alleged intentional torts by city and by co-employees individually, against city was by workers' compensation act; however, against individual co-employees, including police chief, were not barred by workers' compensation act. Russell v. City of Overland Police Dept., 838 F.Supp 1350 (E.D. Mo.).
(1993) Where claimant who was employed by company based in Jefferson City was traveling home from job site at Lake of the Ozarks with saw belonging to company in car, travel did not serve mutual benefit and dual purpose doctrine did not apply. Accident did not occur on employer's or at work site; therefore, claim did not fall within workers' compensation act. Stockman v. J.C. Industries, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 24 (Mo. App. W.D.).
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Legal information, not legal advice. Always confirm with the official source at revisor.mo.gov.