Definitions
This law explains key words used in Missouri's workers' compensation rules. An 'employee' is almost anyone working for a boss under any kind of agreement, including minors, but not someone who owns and drives their own truck leased to a carrier, and not someone working just for food or housing from a charity or religious group. An 'accident' has to be a sudden, unexpected physical event at a specific time and place that causes clear symptoms right away. An 'injury' only counts for workers' comp if the work accident was the main cause — not just one of several causes — of the harm and disability. Some conditions like heart attacks or diseases only count if the work accident was the main cause. A worker who is fully disabled cannot return to any job at all, not just the job they had before. 'Maximum medical improvement' means a doctor has determined the injured worker's condition has stabilized and more treatment won't help.
287.020. Definitions — intent to earlier . — 1. The word "employee" as used in this chapter shall be to mean every person in the of any employer, as defined in this chapter, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, or under any appointment or , including executive officers of corporations. Except as otherwise provided in section 287.200, any reference to any employee who has been injured shall, when the employee is dead, also include his or her , and other persons to whom may be payable. The word "employee" shall also include all s who work for an employer, whether or not such minors are employed in violation of law, and all such minors are hereby made of full age for all purposes under, in connection with, or arising out of this chapter. The word "employee" shall not include an individual who is the owner, as defined in section 301.010, and of a motor vehicle which is leased or with a driver to a operating within a as defined in section 390.020 or 390.041, or operating under a issued by the Missouri of transportation or by the United States Department of Transportation, or any of its subagencies. The word "employee" also shall not include any person performing services for , lodging, aid, or sustenance received from any religious, charitable, or organization.
2. The word "accident" as used in this chapter shall mean an unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift. An injury is not because work was a triggering or precipitating factor.
3. (1) In this chapter the term "injury" is hereby defined to be an injury which has arisen out of and in the course of . An injury by accident is compensable only if the accident was the in causing both the resulting medical condition and . "The prevailing factor" is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability.
(2) An injury shall be to arise out of and in the course of the employment only if:
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon of all the circumstances, that the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the injury; and
(b) It does not come from a or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life.
(3) An injury resulting directly or indirectly from causes is not compensable.
(4) A cardiovascular, pulmonary, respiratory, or other disease, or or suffered by a worker is an injury only if the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the resulting medical condition.
(5) The terms "injury" and "personal injuries" shall mean violence to the physical structure of the body and to the which is used to make up the physical structure of the body, such as artificial dentures, artificial limbs, glass eyes, eyeglasses, and other prostheses which are placed in or on the body to replace the physical structure and such disease or infection as naturally results therefrom. These terms shall in no case except as specifically provided in this chapter be construed to include in any form, nor shall they be construed to include any or disease contracted during the course of the employment, nor shall they include death due to natural causes occurring while the worker is at work.
4. "Death" when mentioned as a basis for the right to compensation means only death resulting from such violence and its resultant occurring within three hundred weeks after the accident; except that in cases of occupational disease, the limitation of three hundred weeks shall not be applicable.
5. Injuries in company-owned or automobiles in accidents that occur while traveling from the employee's home to the employer's or from the employer's principal place of business to the employee's home are not compensable. The is abrogated to the extent it extends for accidents that occur on property not owned or controlled by the employer even if the accident occurs on customary, approved, permitted, usual or accepted routes used by the employee to get to and from their place of employment.
6. The term "" as used in this chapter shall mean inability to to any employment and not merely mean inability to return to the employment in which the employee was engaged at the time of the accident.
7. As used in this chapter and all acts amendatory thereof, the term "" shall hereafter be construed as meaning and referring exclusively to the of Missouri, and the term "" shall hereafter be construed as meaning the of the state of Missouri or such agency of government as shall exercise the powers and duties now conferred and imposed upon the department of commerce and insurance of the state of Missouri.
8. The term "" as used in this chapter means the of the of the state of Missouri.
9. For the purposes of this chapter, the term "minor" means a person who has not attained the age of eighteen years; except that, for the purpose of computing the compensation provided for in this chapter, the of section 287.250 shall control.
10. In applying the provisions of this chapter, it is the intent of the to reject and abrogate earlier case law interpretations on the meaning of or definition of "accident", "occupational disease", "arising out of", and "in the course of the employment" to include, but not be limited to, holdings in: Bennett v. Columbia Health Care and , 80 S.W.3d 524 (Mo.App. W.D. 2002); Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo.banc 1999); and Drewes v. TWA, 984 S.W.2d 512 (Mo.banc 1999) and all cases citing, interpreting, applying, or following those cases.
11. For the purposes of this chapter, "occupational diseases due to " shall only include the following: , , , coal worker's , brochiolitis obliterans, , silicotuberculosis, , acute myelogenous leukemia, and .
12. For the purposes of this chapter, "" shall mean the point at which the injured employee's medical condition has stabilized and can no longer reasonably improve with additional medical care, as determined within a .
(RSMo 1939 § 3695, § 3744, A.L. 1945 p. 1996 (§ 3744), A.L. 1947 V. II p. 438 (§ 3695), A.L. 1959 S.B. 167, A.L. 1963 p. 408, A.L. 1967 p. 384, A.L. 1974 S.B. 417, A.L. 1977 S.B. 49, A.L. 1978 H.B. 1260, A.L. 1980 H.B. 1396, A.L. 1981 H.B. 324, A.L. 1993 S.B. 251, A.L. 2005 S.B. 1 & 130, A.L. 2008 H.B. 1883, A.L. 2013 S.B. 1, A.L. 2017 S.B. 8 merged with S.B. 66 merged with S.B. 222 merged with S.B. 225)
Prior revision: 1929 §§ 3305, 3354
abolished, duties and functions red to and department of transportation, 226.008
Accident
(1967) The definition of the word "accident" is broad enough to include an unusual or abnormal strain, but a back injury suffered in course of usual work where no abnormal or unusual strain contributed to injury was not an accident. Mason v. F.W. Strecker Transfer Company (A.), 409 S.W.2d 267.
(1971) Inhalation of paint dust and paint fumes for a period of over three years by person employed as sander and spray painter of machines, and resulting effect on his body and lungs, including aggravation of of tuberculosis held not an "accident" under this section. Bess v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of St. Louis (A.), 469 S.W.2d 40.
(1973) Held that unusual abnormal and continuous physical and mental strain sustained by over-the-road truck driver constituted an "accident" within the meaning of the workmen's compensation statute. Snugges v. Steel Haulers, Inc. (Mo.) 501 S.W.2d 481.
(1974) Held that where workman was found dying after he had unloaded in his normal job there was no of accident. A heart attack is not "accidental" unless it results from unusual exertion and strain. It is incumbent on to produce evidence of accident. Russell v. Southwest Grease and Oil Co. (A.), 509 S.W.2d 776.
Course of Employment
(1965) Words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are descriptive of its character, while words "in the course of" refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place. Kammeyer v. Board of Education (A.), 393 S.W.2d 122.
(1969) Volunteer working at hospital without pay was an employee within meaning of employee "under any appointment or election" in this section. Orphant v. St. Louis State Hospital, Division of Mental Diseases (Mo.), 441 S.W.2d 355.
(1977) of unincorporated business is not an "employee" and is not eligible for benefits for injury received while performing duties normally performed by an employee. Bethel v. Sunlight Janitor Service (Mo.), 551 S.W.2d 616.
Occupational Disease
(1983) Liberally construing the term "accident" as used in the Act, so long as an injury is clearly job related, it is compensable. Wolfgeher v. Wagner Cartage Service, Inc. (Mo. banc), 646 S.W.2d 781.
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Legal information, not legal advice. Always confirm with the official source at revisor.mo.gov.